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Introduction
In May of 1992, L.C., a woman with mental retardation and
schizophrenia, was voluntarily admitted to a psychiatric unit of a
Georgia hospital.1 By May of 1993, L.C.'s condition had stabilized,
and her treatment professionals determined that community-
based treatment was appropriate, and she could be discharged
from the hospital. 2 Despite this determination, L.C. remained
institutionalized until February of 1996-less than one year after
filing suit against the State of Georgia 3-when the State finally
placed her in a community-based treatment program.4 E.W., a
woman diagnosed with mental retardation and a personality
disorder, entered the same hospital psychiatric unit in February of
1995. 5 By the next year, E.W.'s psychiatrist had decided that "she
t. J.D. expected 2011, University of Minnesota Law School. This Article is
dedicated to the persons with intellectual disabilities with whom I have worked
throughout the years: your struggle for independence has taught me much about
myself. I would like to thank Professor Stephen Befort for his direction with this
Article, and the staff and editors of Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and
Practice for their tireless efforts. I also want to thank my parents, Bill and Elena
Flynn, for their love and support, and Margaret Garvey for her mentorship.
1. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 593 (1999).
2. Id. Community-based treatment, also called supported housing, provides
care and other support services to people with disabilities (amongst other
populations) in their communities, rather than in institutional settings. See, e.g.,
Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 227 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
("Supported housing is an integrated, community-based setting... '). Such
treatment programs allow people with disabilities similar opportunities for
community interaction to those available to people without disabilities. See, e.g., id.
("Supported housing... enables interaction with nondisabled persons to the fullest
extent possible. People who live in supported housing have the autonomy to live
and participate in their communities in essentially the same ways as people
without disabilities.").
3. L.C. filed suit in May 1995 in district court, "alleg[ing] that the State's
failure to place her in a community-based program, once her treating professionals
determined that such placement was appropriate, violated, inter alia, Title II of the
ADA." Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 593-94.
4. Id. at 593.
5. Id. One month after her admittance, the hospital sought to discharge E.W.
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could be treated appropriately in a community-based setting," but
E.W. still remained institutionalized until 1997.6 These women's
stories, typical at the time for people with intellectual disabilities,
became the foundation for the landmark Supreme Court case
Olmstead v. L.C.7 In Olmstead, the Supreme Court held that
"unjustified isolation" of qualified individuals with disabilities
constitutes discrimination in violation of Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA).8 This decision signaled that a
multitude of individuals with intellectual disabilities warehoused
in nursing homes and institutions have the right to live in the
community if "the State's treatment professionals have
determined that community placement is appropriate" and the
placement "is not opposed by the affected individual,"9 regardless
of states' general reluctance to integrate on the basis of cost. 10
Around the same time that Olmstead was decided, the
international disability rights movement was gaining
momentum." In 2001, the United Nations first discussed forming
an ad hoc committee to consider proposals to form an
"international convention to promote and protect the rights and
dignity of persons with disabilities."1 2 The committee met for the
first time in August of 2002, and spent the next five years drafting
to a homeless shelter, but canceled these efforts when E.W.'s attorney intervened.
Id.
6. See id. (noting that E.W. was released from her institutionalization in the
Georgia Regional Hospital a few months after the district court decided her case).
7.. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
8. Id. at 597, 600-01, 602-03; see Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 202, 104 Stat. 327, 337 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132 (2006)) (prohibiting public services from discriminating against persons
with disabilities).
9. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587; see NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, OLMsTEAD:
RECLAIMING INSTITUTIONALIZED LIVES (2003), available at http://www.ncd.gov/
newsroompublications/2003Ireclaimlives.htm (describing how, at the time of the
report, "the number of people with disabilities who currently are denied the
opportunity to live in the most integrated setting is large indeed," and explaining
that a large number of these individuals were residing in Intermediate Care
Facilities for persons with Mental Retardation, nursing homes, and psychiatric
institutions).
10. Traditionally, states have justified continued institutionalization on the
basis of cost, despite the fact that community-based care is usually more cost-
effective. See Laura C. Scotellaro, The Mandated Move from Institutions to
Community Care: Olmstead v. L.C., 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 737, 775 (2000).
11. See, e.g., PAUL T. JAEGER & CYNTHIA ANN BOWMAN, UNDERSTANDING
DISABILITY: INCLUSION, ACCESS, DIVERSITY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 46 (2005) ("A
plethora of nations.., adopted laws or amended their constitutions in the 1990s to
provide the first real legal rights for individuals with disabilities." (citation
omitted)).
12. United Nations Enable-Timeline of Events, http://www.un.org/disabilities/
default.asp?navid=22&pid=153 (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
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the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (Convention) and Optional Protocol.13 On December
13, 2006, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Convention, and on March 30, 2007, it was opened for signature at
U.N. Headquarters in New York City.14 After much
encouragement from the disability rights community, the United
States signed the Convention on July 30, 2009.15 At the time of
this Article, however, President Obama had not yet submitted the
Convention to the Senate for advice and consent.1 6 Considering the
United States' record of exempting itself from human rights
treaties, 17 it is unlikely that the United States will ratify the
Convention without adding reservations (rendering the treaty non-
self-executing) or attaching a declaration of non-self-execution.18
13. Id.; United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
opened for signature Mar. 30, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 443 (entered into force May 3, 2008).
14. United Nations Enable-Timeline of Events, supra note 12.
15. Press Release, Statement by Kathleen G. Sebelius, Sec'y of Health and
Human Servs., On US Signing of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (July 30, 2009), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/O7/20090730a.html ("Today, the United
States joins 141[ ]other nations who have signed the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The signing of the UN Convention
sends an important message that this country is committed to equal rights for
people with disabilities, in the United States and around the world.").
16. As of February 24, 2010, a search of http://www.senate.gov/ reveals no
indication that the Convention is on the Senate calendar or that President Obama
has taken any actions to submit the Convention to the Senate. Cf. President Barack
Obama, Remarks on Signing of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons With
Disabilities Proclamation (July 24, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Rights-
of-Persons-with-Disabiities-Proclamation-Signing/) ("I hope that the Senate can
give swift consideration and approval to the Convention once I submit it for their
advice and consent."). Until the Senate has advised on and consented to a treaty, it
is not considered binding. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The president] shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur .. ").
17. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Human Rights, American Exceptionalism, and the
Stories We Tell, 23 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 41, 42 (2009) (defining "American
exceptionalism" as "the United States' practice of unilaterally exempting itself from
participation in international organizations and human rights treaties while
simultaneously insisting that the rest of the world comply with international
norms.").
18. Ann M. Piccard, U.S. Ratification of CEDAW: From Bad to Worse?, 28 LAW
& INEQ. 119, 142-43 (2009) ("[H]uman rights treaties have long been considered to
be non-self-executing."); Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The
Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV.
599, 677 (2008) ("Treatymakers can attempt to make a treaty non-self-executing by
attaching either a reservation or a declaration to this effect. The difference between
a reservation and a declaration is that a reservation modifies the legal effect of
certain provisions of a treaty, whereas a declaration does not.").
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This Article argues that, in light of the United States' signing
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the
states should abandon their cost-driven deinstitutionalization
plans based on the Olmstead holding (Olmstead plans)19 in favor of
programs which guarantee the rights of persons with disabilities
under the Convention. Part I of this Article details the
development of states' deinstitutionalization plans arising from
the Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead. Part II describes the
problematic aspects of these Olmstead plans. Part III introduces
the applicable provisions of the Convention which run contrary to
aspects of states' cost-centered plans. Finally, Part IV asserts that
states should incorporate the rights guaranteed under the
Convention into their Olmstead plans and proposes a standard to
integrate them.
I. The Development of Olmstead Plans
A. History of Legislation Protecting People with Disabilities
As Justice Marshall pointed out in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center,20 "the mentally retarded have been
subject to a 'lengthy and tragic history' of segregation and
discrimination that can only be called grotesque."21 In the late
1950s and early 1960s, the country began to take notice of the
dismal conditions in state hospitals treating individuals with
mental disabilities. 22 In response to segregation and other
injustices, the disability rights community began gaining strength
19. E.g., Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2005) ("One
state defense under the ADA, which was explicitly approved by the [Supreme]
Court, is the existence of a state plan for deinstitutionalization (an 'Olmstead
Plan').").
20. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
21. Id. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting
Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978)) (citation omitted).
22. Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights Law and Comparative
Mental Disability Law: The Universal Factors, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'LL. & COM. 333,
335 (2007) (quoting a witness' 1961 congressional hearing testimony that
"[s]ome... physicians I interviewed frankly admitted that the animals of nearby
piggeries were better housed, fed[,] and treated than many of the patients on their
wards.") (quoting Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong.
41-42 (1961) (statement of Albert Deutsch, author and journalist)). During this
period, the chairman of the Northeast Regional Legal Action Committee of the
National Association for Retarded Children described Pennhurst State School and
Hospital, the subject of Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1 (1981), as "Dachau, without ovens." Id. (citing LEOPOLD LIPPMAN & I.
IGNACY GOLDBERG, THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION: ANATOMY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
CASE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 17 (1973)).
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in the 1970s 23 and advocating for legislation that would "prohibit[]
discrimination against and require[ accommodation of people with
disabilities. '24 Congress responded by passing the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973,25 which proscribed discrimination against persons
with disabilities in the public sector, 26 and the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act in 1975,27 which
indicated that services for people with disabilities "should be
provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's
personal liberty."28 This legislation, however, did not quell the
dissatisfaction of the disability rights community, portions of
which continued to criticize the government's "disability welfare
programs" 29 as .'support[ing] large segments of the population in
relatively idle dependency.' 30 Equality and independence, to the
fullest extent possible, were disability rights activists' ultimate
goals.3 1
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities
Act,32 described by Professor Ruth Colker as "the culmination of
more than two decades of law-reform efforts by the disability
community."33 This legislation had significant benefits for people
with intellectual disabilities in institutions. Generally, the ADA
prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities on the
basis of these disabilities in the employment,3 4 public services, 35
and public accommodation sectors.3 6 More specifically, it defines
segregation as a form of discrimination, and indicates that
23. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 12
(2004).
24. Id.
25. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 354.
26. Id.
27. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No.
94-103, § 111, 89 Stat. 486, 502 (1975).
28. Id.
29. Bagenstos, supra note 23, at 12-18 (discussing disability rights activists'
critiques that coalesced in the 1970s and challenged the disability benefits system
as, inter alia, being paternalistic, encouraging disabled individuals' complacency,
and fostering dependence).
30. Id. at 16 (quoting PEG NOSEK ET AL., A PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION FOR
THE INDEPENDENT LIVING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENTS 11 (1982)).
31. See id. at 14-18.
32.- Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. 2009)).
33. RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 22 (2005).
34. § 102(a), 104 Stat. at 331-32 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006
& Supp. 2009)).
35. § 202, 104 Stat. at 337 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006)).
36. § 302(a), 104 Stat. at 355 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
2010]
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"discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in
such critical areas as... institutionalization.... ."37 While Title I
of the ADA focuses on proscribing discrimination against people
with disabilities in the workplace, 3 Title II prohibits public
entities from excluding a "qualified individual with a
disability.. . , by reason of such disability" from "[public] services,
programs, or activities," including state-funded care.39 In addition,
Congress instructed the Attorney General to "promulgate
regulations" to enforce Title 11,40 leading to what has come to be
known as the "integration regulation," requiring that "public
entit[ies] ... administer services, programs, and activities in the
most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
individuals with disabilities."41 Together, these portions of the
ADA and its subsequent regulations provided the legislative
backdrop for the Olmstead holding.
B. Olmstead v. L.C.
In L.C. v. Olmstead,42 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's judgment that Georgia's failure to place L.C. and
E.W. in community-based settings violated Title II of the ADA.43
The court remanded the case, instructing the lower court to
determine whether the state could meet its burden of proving
"that requiring.., these additional expenditures would be so
unreasonable given the demands of the State's mental health
budget that it would fundamentally alter the service it
provides ... ."44 Because this instruction would defeat nearly any
cost defense a state could raise,45 the Supreme Court granted
Georgia's petition for certiorari on the issue of cost.46
37. § 2(a)(3), 104 Stat. at 328 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3)).
38. Tit. I, 104 Stat. at 330 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2006
& Supp. 2009)) (codified within Subchapter I-Employment).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006).
40. Id. § 12134(a).
41.. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2006). This "integration regulation," or the
"integration mandate," is also attributed to Olmstead, due to its holding
interpreting the regulation. See, e.g., Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F.
Supp. 2d 184, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) ('The 'integration mandate' ... as expressed in
federal regulations and Olmstead requires that when a state provides services to
individuals with disabilities, it must do so 'in the most integrated setting
appropriate to their needs."' (citations omitted)).
42. 138 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1998).
43. Id. at 895.
44. Id. at 905.
45. Justice Ginsburg described how the Eleventh Circuit's construction would
leave states "virtually defenseless" when plaintiffs are shown to be qualified for
community placement because the "expense entailed in placing one or two people"
[Vol. 28:407
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In Olmstead, the Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in substantial part, interpreting Title II of the
ADA and the integration mandate to prohibit "unjustified
placement or retention of persons in institutions" as a form of
discrimination. 47 The Olmstead majority approved the Eleventh
Circuit's finding that "the State's duty to provide integrated
services 'is not absolute."' 48 The Court agreed with the Eleventh
Circuit that the ADA proscribed the continued institutionalization
of the Olmstead respondents. 49 The majority, however, also held
that the Eleventh Circuit erroneously instructed the lower court
on the State's "fundamental alteration" defense,50 reasoning that
such a defense should be used "only in the most limited of
circumstances."5' To correct this error, Justice Ginsburg, writing
for a plurality,52 provided instructions to lower courts on the
appropriate use of the fundamental alteration defense:
In evaluating a State's fundamental-alteration defense, the
District Court must consider, in view of the resources
in the community would always be miniscule when measured "against the State's
entire mental health budget." Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 603 (1999) (plurality
opinion).
46. Id. at 595-96 (majority opinion). After the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, the district court issued a decision on remand holding that "the annual
cost... of providing community-based treatment to L.C. and E.W. was not
unreasonable in relation to the State's overall mental health budget." Id. at 596
n.7.
47. Id. at 596-97.
48. Id. at 595 (quoting Olmstead, 138 F.3d at 904). Compare id., with id. at 603
(plurality opinion) ('The State's responsibility, once it provides community-based
treatment to qualified persons with disabilities, is not boundless.").
49. Id. at 597 (majority opinion) ("Unjustified isolation, we hold, is properly
regarded as discrimination based on disability.").
50. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2009) ("A public entity shall make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are
necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity
can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the
nature of the service, program, or activity." (emphasis added)). Compare Olmstead,
527 U.S. at 595 ('The appeals court thought it clear.., that 'Congress wanted to
permit a cost defense only in the most limited of circumstances."' (quoting
Olmstead, 138 F.3d at 902)), with id. at 603-04 (plurality opinion) (noting that the
Eleventh Circuit's interpretation that cost-based defenses are allowed only in the
most limited of circumstances is too restrictive, and that "[s]ensibly construed, the
fundamental-alteration component of the reasonable-modifications regulation
would allow the State to show that, in the allocation of available resources,
immediate relief for the plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the responsibility the
state has undertaken for the care and treatment of a large and diverse population
of persons with mental disabilities.").
51. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 595 (quoting Olmstead, 138 F.3d at 902).
52. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion for the Court, but was joined
in the final Part of her opinion by only Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer. Id.
at 587.
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available to the State, not only the cost of providing
community-based care to the litigants, but also the range of
services the State provides others with mental disabilities,
and the State's obligation to mete out those services
equitably.5
3
A state, therefore, can prevail on a fundamental alteration defense
if it is able to show that providing community-based services to the
litigants would disrupt its ability to provide services to "others
with mental disabilities."54 In such an instance, a state need only
"demonstrate that it ha[s] a comprehensive, effectively working
plan" for deinstitutionalizing qualified individuals with disabilities
and "a waiting list that move[s] at a reasonable pace not controlled
by the State's endeavors to keep its institutions fully
populated.. .. "55 Under Justice Ginsburg's opinion, such an
Olmstead plan can help support a state's fundamental alteration
defense.
Justice Ginsburg provided virtually no guidance as to what
constitutes an effectively working plan for deinstitutionalization,
and she supplied only minimal clarification of what constitutes a
"reasonably paced waiting list." Justice Ginsburg explained that
this list does not require immediately placing qualified individuals
in community-based care. 56 Rather, the State can require a person
to wait for an available spot, thereby preventing a court from
"order[ing] displacement of persons at the top of the community-
based treatment waiting list by individuals lower down who
commence[ civil actions."57 As a result, states do not have to
provide "immediate relief' to people with intellectual disabilities
for whom community placement is deemed appropriate if such
relief would be "inequitable."5 Apart from these limitations,
however, states can construct their waiting lists as they please.
Considering the ambiguous "effectively working" and "reasonably
paced waiting list" standards, 59 states have broad leeway in
53. Id. at 597. Justice Ginsburg also reminded courts to apply a "case-by-case
analysis," assessing the "nature and cost of the accommodation needed" in relation
to the State's budget, pursuant to regulations implementing § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 606 n.16 (plurality opinion); see 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b)
(2006); 28 C.F.R. § 42.511(c) (2009).
54. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597, 607 (plurality opinion).
55. Id. at 605-06.
56. See id. at 606 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Olmstead, 527
U.S. 581 (No. 98-536)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 603-04.
59. See Melody M. Kubo, Implementing Olmstead v. L.C.: Defining "Effectively
Working" Plans for "Reasonably Paced" Wait Lists for Medicaid Home and
Community-Based Services Waiver Programs, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 731, 743 (2001)
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developing their Olmstead plans, allowing them "[t]o maintain a
range of facilities and to administer services with an even hand."6 0
C. Olmstead Plans: A Surge of Community Integration?
After Olmstead, states began developing
deinstitutionalization plans, using Medicaid waiver homes as the
prime vehicle for community integration.61 In 2001, to support
states' endeavors, President George W. Bush announced the "New
Freedom Initiative," followed by Executive Order 13217, to
support states in meeting Olmstead goals and as "a nationwide
effort to remove barriers to community living for people of all ages
with disabilities and long-term illnesses." 62 Under the New
Freedom Initiative, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services provide funding for states to integrate people with
disabilities into the community. 63 President Bush also enacted
"Money Follows the Person" as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of
2005,64 to "assist States in their efforts to reduce their reliance on
(explaining that the Olmstead majority "left undefined key terms" such as
"effectively working" and "reasonable pace").
60. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion).
61. See Julia Gilmore Gaughan, Institutionalization as Discrimination: How
Medicaid Waivers, the ADA, and § 1983 Fail, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 405, 406 (2008)
(explaining how the federal government is "pouring money" into Medicaid programs
to achieve community integration); Amy Tidwell, Deinstitutionalization: Georgia's
Progress in Developing and Implementing an "Effectively Working Plan" as
Required by Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 699, 700, 707-13 (2009)
(noting that states, "prompted by the Olmstead decision .... began developing
'Olmstead Plans' for moving individuals out of institutions and providing services
to people with disabilities in community settings" and comparing holdings in the
Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals-the only circuit courts to have defined
"effectively working plans"-in cases originating with state plans that included
Medicaid waivers); see also Henry Korman, Clash of the Integrationists: The
Mismatch of Civil Rights Imperatives in Supportive Housing for People with
Disabilities, 26 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 12 (2007) ("[Ilt is... true that after
out-of-pocket personal expenditures, the largest source of funds for long-term care
and community-based supportive services is the Medical Assistance or Medicaid
Program."). Medicaid waivers allow states to use federal Medicaid funding to
provide community-based care for people with disabilities. See, e.g., STATE OF
TENNESSEE DIVISION OF MENTAL RETARDATION SERVICES, A FAMILY GUIDE TO
MEDICAID WAIVER SERVICES (2002), available at http://www.state.tn.us/dids/
consumerservices/fgmwb.pdf.
62. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid
Servs., Overview New Freedom Initiative, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
NewFreedomInitiative/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
63. Peter Blanck, Justice for All? Stories About Americans with Disabilities
and Their Civil Rights, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 16 (2004).
64. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, Subchapter B, 120 Stat.
4, 102-10 (2006) (outlining 'Money Follows the Person Rebalancing
Demonstration" provisions). According to President George W. Bush, the Deficit
Reduction Act was enacted to "restrain federal spending," especially in the realm of
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institutional care while developing community-based long-term
care opportunities, enabling the elderly and people with
disabilities to fully participate in their communities." 65 Together,
these two programs enabled the federal government to assist
states with establishing their deinstitutionalization plans in
compliance with Olmstead's integration mandate. 66
As Justice Ginsburg mentioned in Olmstead, however, states
do not have a "boundless" duty to provide community-based care. 67
Rather, Medicaid regulations with which states must comply in
order to receive funding6 8 and the "reasonably paced waiting list"
analysis of Olmstead69 both limit states' duties. Medicaid
regulations not only allow the federal government to control its
costs, but also enable states to minimize their own costs while
implementing Olmstead plans. State plan and payment provisions
outlined in federal law prevent states from granting a waiver
unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services agrees that
the estimated costs of community care do not exceed the
reasonable estimated costs of institutional care.70 Health and
Human Services regulations require a state to submit
documentation "indicat[ing] the number of unduplicated
beneficiaries to which it intends to provide waiver services in each
year of its program," thereby imposing "a limit on the size of the
waiver program unless the State requests and the Secretary
"mandatory spending," such as Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Security, which
were "growing faster than the economy, faster than the population, and nearly
three times the rate of inflation." President George W. Bush, President Signs
S.1932, Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (Feb. 8, 2006) (transcript available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060208-
8.html).
65. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., supra note 62.
66. Although both programs involve providing states with additional funding,
this funding can be viewed as a long-term investment because community-based
care for qualified individuals is often cheaper than institutional care. See
Scotellaro, supra note 10, at 777 ("[A] 1995 study conducted for the American
Journal of Mental Retardation found that providing community-based care to
individuals with disabilities is more cost effective than providing care within an
institution. It also found that state-owned institutions were the most expensive
setting in which to provide services to the disabled. Furthermore, in addition to
being more expensive than community care, the costs of institutional care are
rising. Therefore, in the future, states will benefit more from transferring qualified
disabled individuals into community-based settings." (footnotes omitted)).
67. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 603 (1999) (plurality opinion).
68. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (2006 & Supp. 2009); 42 C.F.R. § 441.303
(2009).
69. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605-06 (plurality opinion).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(D) (2006 & Supp. 2009); see also id. § 1396n(c)(6)
(detailing that the Secretary cannot deny a waiver because the actual costs exceed
estimated costs of community-based care).
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approves a greater number of waiver participants in a waiver
amendment." 71 Slots under this limited number of placements, or
cap, will not open up unless "individuals ... die or become
ineligible for services under the State plan."72
The "reasonably paced waiting list" analysis presented in
Olmstead also limits states' responsibilities to provide community-
based care and allows them to control costs. 73 However, because
Justice Ginsburg's opinion does not define the term "reasonable
pace" and provides only limited guidance on wait lists, the lower
courts have been forced to decipher the ambiguous "reasonably
paced wait list" standard (if it can be called a standard at all) in
post-Olmstead litigation.74  When taken together, Medicaid
legislation and the "reasonably paced waiting list" analysis,
though limiting in some aspects, supply each state with broad
leeway to determine the size and speed of its Medicaid waiver
program, without any pressure from the federal government to
increase the size of such programs or hasten community
integration.
In short, states have nearly unrestricted freedom to develop
their Olmstead plans in a manner that minimizes costs. As long as
states are able to show that they are complying with Medicaid
waiver regulations and that they have reasonably paced waiting
lists in place, they can often prevail with fundamental alteration
defenses when contesting Olmstead claims. 75 As subsequent case
law demonstrates, this freedom often allows states to keep
qualified individuals with disabilities institutionalized, even when
community-based placement would be appropriate. 76
71. 42 C.F.R. § 441.303(f)(6) (2009).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(9) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
73. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605-06 (plurality opinion).
74. Kubo, supra note 59, at 743.
75. See Samantha A. DiPolito, Olmstead v. L.C.-Deinstitutionalization and
Community Integration: An Awakening of the Nation's Conscience?, 58 MERCER L.
REV. 1381, 1399 (2007) ("[M]easuring the progress of Olmstead implementation is
problematic because 'there are no clearly stated objectives, budgets, or timetables.'
In fact, an emerging theme from post-Olmstead cases is judicial encouragement of
policy change, but minimal desire to actually enforce the change process. Lower
courts have generally decided that evidence of states' active commitment, yet slow
progress towards community integration, satisfies the ADA. Commentators
criticize these decisions as '[riewarding rather than sanctioning states that move
slowly toward change."' (footnotes omitted)).
76. See, e.g., Arc of Wash. State v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 616 (9th Cir. 2005);
Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2002).
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II. The Shortcomings of Olmstead Plans
Since there are few statistics or studies on the number of
qualified individuals with disabilities awaiting community
placement, 77 it is difficult to accurately measure states' compliance
with Olmstead's integration mandate. Case law, however,
demonstrates the states' failures to develop Olmstead plans that
transfer qualified individuals to community placements in a timely
manner, thereby contravening the integration mandate. 78 By
examining two representative cases, one can see that states often
utilize unreasonably paced wait lists and unreasonable caps on
Medicaid waiver programs in their Olmstead plans, 79 forcing wait-
listed individuals to remain on such lists for indefinite periods of
time. o First, in Bryson v. Shumway8 l the First Circuit Court of
Appeals held that qualified individuals with disabilities are not
"entitled to reasonable promptness" for community-based services
unless they are on a wait list.82 Second, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in Arc of Washington State, Inc. v. Braddock83
allowed states to limit the size of their Medicaid waiver programs,
permitting states to engage in practices that inhibit significant
progress in integrating qualified individuals with disabilities into
their communities.8 4
A. Bryson v. Shumway
Bryson v. Shumway involved a New Hampshire Medicaid
waiver program that did not have room for all qualified
77. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, OLMsTEAD: RECLAIMING
INSTITUTIONALIzED LIVES (2003), available at http:ltwww.ncd.gov/newsrooml
publications/2003/reclaimlives.htm (stating that "[a]lthough formal assessment
data are lacking," related studies lead to the conclusion that nearly all qualified
disabled individuals could be placed in a community setting).
78. See infra Part II.A-B.
79. See infra Part II.A-B.
80. Cf. Sean Jessee, Fulfilling the Promise of the Medicaid Act: Why the Equal
Access Clause Creates Privately Enforceable Rights, 58 EMORY L.J. 791, 815 (2009)
(noting that, while circuit courts have consistently held that Medicaid patients
have an enforceable right under the reasonable promptness clause, Medicaid
patients face substantial legal obstacles if they attempt to file lawsuits because the
clause is unclear on whether it requires states to pay for services with reasonable
promptness or to provide services with reasonable promptness, and the Supreme
Court has never answered the question).
81.. 308 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2002).
82. Id. at 88.
83. 427 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2005).
84. See id. at 620 ("So long as states are genuinely and effectively in the




individuals with disabilities who wanted to participate.8 5 The
plaintiffs, individuals seeking placement in the waiver program,
sued for injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,86
arguing, in part, that Medicaid services must be provided "with
reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals" under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(8).8 7 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
"reasonable promptness" required the State to request a waiver
program that accommodated at least 200 people.88 The case,
however, was ultimately remanded for fact-finding to determine
whether the State had violated "reasonable promptness" through
an alleged failure to fill the individual waiver slots it had already
requested.8 9 Most importantly, the court held that "[t]hose
patients who are on the waiting list and for whom slots are
available are, we think, 'eligible' under the statute such that they
are entitled to reasonable promptness." 90 In other words, the First
Circuit determined that patients not on Medicaid program waiting
lists are not entitled to "reasonable promptness" in receiving
services.
Although presented as dicta in Bryson, this sentiment
demonstrates the First Circuit's reluctance to challenge states'
waiting lists. The court simply deferred to the State's discretion in
both the size of the waiver program and the speed of placement,
leaving it up to the State to determine what is reasonably prompt.
The practical result of this holding is that a plaintiff cannot
prevail on a reasonable promptness claim unless he or she is
already on a waiting list and there is a waiver slot open and
85. Bryson, 308 F.3d at 81.
86. Id. at 83. Forty-two U.S.C. § 1983 allows litigants to bring civil claims
against persons or entities whom they consider to have deprived them of "rights,
privileges[,] or immunities" secured by a law of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2006).
87. Bryson, 308 F.3d at 83-84; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a), (a)(8) (2006 & Supp.
2009) ("A State plan for medical assistance must.., provide that all individuals
wishing to make application for medical assistance under the plan shall have
opportunity to do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable
promptness to all eligible individuals .... ").
88. Bryson, 308 F.3d at 84-86 (indicating that plaintiffs relied upon outdated
statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(10) and stating that the Department of
Health and Human Services' interpretation that the statute is not intended to
require providing service to exactly 200 individuals should receive deference).
89. Id. at 89-90. On remand, the district court ruled that the relief plaintiffs
sought-expansion of the waiver program-would constitute a fundamental
alteration because it was impractical for the State to provide a sufficient number of
slots to eliminate its wait list altogether. Bryson v. Stephen, Civil No. 99-CV-558-
SM, 2006 WL 2805238, at *1 (D.N.H. Sept. 29, 2006).
90. Bryson, 308 F.3d at 88 (footnote omitted).
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available. 91 While the district court subsequently determined that
an average wait of one year for an open slot is not unreasonable,
this year does not include the time it takes for a person with a
disability to apply and be determined eligible for services. 92
Further complicating these requirements is the simple fact that
the population of persons with disabilities is not static and will
likely grow, while a state's budget may not.93 States have few
incentives for growing waiver programs, and, on the contrary,
have financial incentives to keep more individuals in
institutions.94 As a result, in order to avoid the legal obligation to
provide community placements with reasonable promptness,
states can maintain waiting lists that are either short or static.
The Bryson dicta demonstrates lower courts' laissez-faire attitudes
towards states and their questionably "reasonably paced" waiting
lists.
B. Arc of Washington State, Inc. v. Braddock
In Arc of Washington State, Inc. v. Braddock, the Arc of
Washington State, Inc. and three developmentally disabled
individuals (Arc)95 argued that Title II of the ADA prohibited
91. See Gaughan, supra note 61, at 423.
92. Bryson, 2006 WL 2805238, at *6 ("While there are exceptions due to
circumstances peculiar to the individual needs of persons on the list, by and large
the wait for an open slot in the program is about a year-shorter for some, longer
for others .... An average wait of approximately twelve months on the list, from
qualification to assignment of a program slot, is not an unreasonable period."
(emphasis added)).
93. See, e.g., OR. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., SENIORS AND PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES Div., WAYS AND MEANS PRESENTATION 4 (2007), available at
http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/aboutdhs/budget/07-09budget/ways-means/
spdwm..overview_3.doc.pdf ("After years of expanding caseloads, [Oregon's
Department of Human Services] was forced in 2002 and 2003 to eliminate
programs and services to selected groups of people. In 2003, to balance the state's
budget, the Legislature approved eliminating services to approximately 4,874
seniors and people with physical disabilities who did not meet more limited
eligibility criteria.").
94. See, e.g., DiPolito, supra note 75, at 1403 (using the state of Georgia's
financial arrangements for mental health care as an illustration of systems in
which "the cost of institutional care, unlike that of community-based services, is not
required to be a line-item budget expense. Rather, the funding of institutional care
can be amortized, which amounts to a much more politically suitable financial
arrangement. As a result, the government's bias in favor of institutions is
perpetuated.").
95. The Arc is an organization with national and statewide chapters which
supports people with disabilities and their families. The Arc of the United States,
About Us, http://www.thearc.orgtNetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=1386 (last visited
Feb. 16, 2010). "Arc" once stood for "Association for Retarded Citizens," but in 1992,
its name changed to the more politically correct "the Arc." See The Arc of the
United States, The Arc's Name Changes Throughout Its History,
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Washington "from maintaining any fixed [Home and Community-
Based Services (HCBS)] cap."96  The Arc claimed that
"Washington's HCBS program [was] too small to accommodate the
state's population of eligible participants" and therefore
Washington should have requested an increase in the size of the
program. 97 In its decision, the court stated that it had to consider
whether forcing the state to comply with the Arc's request would
constitute a 'reasonable modification' (which is required) or a
'fundamental alteration' (which is not)," 98 but did not actually
conduct a case-specific analysis of the proposed expansion cost in
relation to Washington's budget, as Olmstead instructed.99 The
http://www.thearc.orglNetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=403 (last visited Feb. 11,
2010). Although this suit was initially a class action, the class was decertified. Arc
of Wash. State, Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615, 617 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005).
96. Braddock, 427 F.3d at 617. HCBS caps, or limits on the size of HCBS
waiver programs, are required under federal regulations. 42 C.F.R. § 441.303(f)(6)
(2009) ('The State must indicate the number of unduplicated beneficiaries to which
it intends to provide waiver services in each year of its program. This number will
constitute a limit on the size of the waiver program .... ); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396n(c)(9) (2006 & Supp. 2009) (providing rules for waiver programs "which
contain[] a limit on the number of individuals who shall receive home or
community-based services ... ").
97. Braddock, 427 F.3d at 619.
98. Id. Twenty-eight C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) requires a state to make "reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are
necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the [state] can
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature
of the service, program, or activity." 28 C.F.R. § 35,130(b)(7) (2009); see also
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 603 (1999) (plurality opinion) (noting that the
states must make "reasonable modifications" to avoid discrimination, but are
allowed to resist modifications that entail "fundamental alterations" to the states'
services and programs (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1998))).
99. Braddock, 427 F.3d at 621; Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 606 n.16 (plurality
opinion). The Braddock court explained that it had "twice explored the boundary
between 'reasonable modifications' and 'fundamental alterations' in the context of
Medicaid waiver programs for the disabled." Id. at 619. It drew parallels between
the Braddock plaintiffs' claims and those of the plaintiffs in Sanchez v. Johnson,
who had challenged California's waiver program. Braddock, 427 F.3d at 620;
Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1063 (9th Cir. 2005). Both cases, said the court,
challenged the size of the State's waiver program. Braddock, 427 F.3d at 620 n.4
(noting that the Sanchez plaintiffs challenged program size based on funding,
rather than the waiver program's cap); see Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1062-63. In
Sanchez, the court affirmed a district court holding that the state "already ha[d] in
place an acceptable plan for deinstitutionalization, the disruption of which would
involve a fundamental alteration of the State's current policies and practices in
contravention of the Supreme Court's instructions in Olmstead." Sanchez, 416 F.3d
at 1063, 1068. The Braddock court explained that the record in Sanchez indicated
that California's "commitment to the deinstitutionalization of those [disabled
persons] for whom community integration is desirable, achievable[,] and
unopposed, is genuine, comprehensive[,] and reasonable." Braddock, 427 F.3d at
620 (quoting Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1067). Though the district court in Braddock had
granted partial summary judgment and dismissed the action, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that "the record.., already contain[ed] all [it] need[ed] to make this
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court bypassed such analysis in affirming the district court's
summary judgment grant and dismissal, 100 holding that:
[W]hen there is evidence that a State has in place a
comprehensive deinstitutionalization scheme, which, in light
of existing budgetary constraints and the competing demands
of other services that the State provides, including the
maintenance of institutional care facilities, is "effectively
working," the courts will not tinker with that scheme. 10 1
To support its holding, the court cited statutory provisions
indicating that Congress intended limitations on the size of waiver
programs.10 2  The court's holding, based on this cursory
examination, failed to address the heart of the plaintiffs' claim
that Washington's waiver program should be expanded.
Washington could essentially do as it pleased, as long as it
demonstrated a "reasonable" level of "commitment to
deinstitutionalization."'10 3
Braddock, like Bryson, leaves open the possibility that there
could be any number of qualified individuals waiting indefinitely
for community placement due to the limited size of waiver
determination. There [wa]s. .. no need for further factual development" because
"[t]he record reflect[ed] that Washington's commitment to deinstitutionalization
[wa]s as 'genuine, comprehensive and reasonable' as the state's commitment in
Sanchez." Braddock, 427 F.3d at 616, 620; see Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 606 n.18
(1999) (plurality opinion) (instructing the lower courts to apply a "case-by-case
analysis," assessing, among other factors, the "nature and cost of the
accommodation needed" in relation to the State's budget).
100. Braddock, 427 F.3d at 616, 622.
101. Id. at 621 (citing Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1067-68) (citation omitted).
102. Id. at 618. Forty-two C.F.R. § 441.303(f)(6) imposes a limit on the number
of "unduplicated recipients" a state provides with waiver services, unless the state
requests and the Secretary of Health and Human Services approves a greater
number. 42 C.F.R. § 441.303(f)(6) (2009). Forty-two U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(9) allows
states to keep their numbers of waiver recipients consistent by "replac[ing] any
individuals who [are currently eligible for waiver slots only when they] die or
become ineligible for services under the State plan." 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(9) (2006
& Supp. 2009). However, the Secretary is prohibited from limiting the number of
individuals who may receive HCBS services under a waiver to fewer than 200
(though states themselves may choose to make a lower number available). 42
U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(10) (2006 & Supp. 2009); see Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79,
85-86 (2002) (discussing states' ability to choose to limit their Medicaid waiver
programs to fewer than 200 individuals).
103. Braddock, 427 F.3d at 621. The court determined that Washington was
committed to deinstitutionalization because its HCBS program:
(1) is sizeable, with a cap that has increased substantially over the past
two decades; (2) is full; (3) is available to all Medicaid-eligible disabled
persons as slots become available, based only on their mental-health needs
and position on the waiting list; (4) has already significantly reduced the
size of the state's institutionalized population; and (5) has experienced
budget growth in line with, or exceeding [that ofl, other state agencies.
Id. at 621-22.
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programs. States have minimal incentives to increase the size of
their waiver programs by requesting more slots or waivers.
Although waiver programs were designed to "provide individuals
with individualized services that allow [people with disabilities] to
live at home, . . . [states'] program[s] as implemented [have] been
driven more by cost concerns than by ... individual[s'] special
needs." 0 4
III. The "Right" to Deinstitutionalization Under the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities 105 provides an alternative approach to the issue of
deinstitutionalization, focusing more on the individual needs of
people with disabilities. While Olmstead affirms states' freedom to
provide community-based services in the most cost-effective
manner,10 6 the Convention emphasizes "the importance for
persons with disabilities of their individual autonomy and
independence, including the freedom to make their own choices." 10 7
Although both support community integration, the Convention's
human rights focus champions the needs and desires of the
individual over financial concerns.
The Convention sets forth several human rights common to
all persons, including persons with disabilities, that States Parties
are obligated to enforce.108 Several of these provisions are
applicable to institutionalization. Article 14, clause 1 requires
that:
States Parties . . . ensure that persons with disabilities, on an
equal basis with others:
(a) Enjoy the right to liberty and security of person;
104. Kubo, supra note 59, at 738-39. But cf. H.R. REP. No. 97-208, at 966 (1981)
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1010, 1328 ('The determination of
which long-term care options are feasible in a particular instance should be based
on an individual's needs, as determined by an evaluation, and not short-term cost-
savings." (emphasis added)).
105. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
supra note 13.
106. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 603-07 (1999) (plurality opinion)
(discussing costs associated with institutionalization and how states can and
should balance them); see also Kubo, supra note 59, at 743 (noting that the
Supreme Court's deference to state funding decisions was apparent in Olmstead).
107. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
supra note 13, at pmbl., n.
108. See id. art. 4.
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(b) Are not deprived of their liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily,
and that any deprivation of liberty is in conformity with the
law, and that the existence of a disability shall in no case
justify a deprivation of liberty. 10 9
Unnecessary institutionalization constitutes a "deprivation of
liberty" prohibited by the Convention, 1 0 because it is based on
disability and deprives individuals with disabilities of reasonable
accommodation."' Moreover, Article 19, titled "Living
independently and being included in the community," speaks
directly to the issue of institutionalization.1 2 This provision states
that:
States Parties to this Convention recognize the equal right of
all persons with disabilities to live in the community, with
choices equal to others, and shall take effective and
appropriate measures to facilitate full enjoyment by persons
with disabilities of this right and their full inclusion and
participation in the community, including by ensuring that:
(a) Persons with disabilities have the opportunity to choose
their place of residence and where and with whom they live on
an equal basis with others and are not obliged to live in a
particular living arrangement;
(b) Persons with disabilities have access to a range of in-home,
residential and other community support services, including
personal assistance necessary to support living and inclusion
in the community, and to prevent isolation or segregation from
the community;
(c) Community services and facilities for the general
population are available on an equal basis to persons with
disabilities and are responsive to their needs.113
Together, these provisions guarantee persons with disabilities'
rights to enjoy freedom from institutionalization and live in the
community setting of their choice.
The Convention recognizes, however, that States Parties'
duties to enforce the Convention are not boundless. Article 2 of the
Convention defines "reasonable accommodation" as "necessary and
appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a
disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular
case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or
exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms." 114 This provision indicates that a State
109. Id. art. 14, cl. 1.
110. See id.
111. See id. art. 14, c. 1-2.
112. Id. art. 19.
113. Id.
114. Id. art. 2.
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Party's obligations under the Convention could be limited upon a
showing that an accommodation a person with a disability
requests poses a "disproportionate or undue burden," somewhat
comparable to the fundamental alteration defense established in
Olmstead.115 But the Convention also indicates that a State
Party's duty to enforce the rights of persons with disabilities' could
vary depending upon its resources:
With regard to economic, social[,] and cultural rights, each
State Party undertakes to take measures to the maximum of
its available resources and, where needed, within the
framework of international cooperation, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of these rights,
without prejudice to those obligations contained in the present
Convention that are immediately applicable according to
international law. 116
A State Party is therefore obligated to take measures to promote
and protect the economic, social, and cultural rights of persons
with disabilities. Considering that cost concerns primarily drive
states' deinstitutionalization plans, 1" 7 it appears that the United
115. Compare id. ("Reasonable accommodation' means necessary and
appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or
undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with
disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms...."), with Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 604
(1999) (plurality opinion) (noting that a state could affirmatively raise a
fundamental alteration defense by showing that "immediate relief for the plaintiffs
would be inequitable, given the responsibility the State has undertaken for the care
and treatment of a large and diverse population of persons with mental
disabilities.").
116. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
supra note 13, art. 4, cl. 2 (emphasis added). This language is similar to that of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which
the United States has refused to ratify. International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights art. 8, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. D, 95-2 (1978), 993
U.N.T.S. 3.; see UNCHR: The UN Refugee Agency, Refworld, International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights List of States Parties
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36cO.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2010)
(noting that the United States signed the ICESCR on October 5, 1977, but has not
yet ratified it); see also Linda M. Keller, The American Rejection of Economic Rights
as Human Rights & the Declaration of Independence: Does the Pursuit of Happiness
Require Basic Economic Rights?, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 557, 562 (2003)
("[Tihe United States refuses to recognize that 'economic, social and cultural rights'
are rights."). Some critics suggest that it is the "maximum of its available
resources" language that prevents the United States from ratifying the ICESCR.
See, e.g., Hannah A. Saona, The Protection of Reproductive Rights Under
International Law: The Bush Administration's Policy Shift and China's Family
Planning Practices, 13 PAc. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 229, 251 (2004) ("[Ihe United States
has acted in direct opposition to its responsibility to act in accordance with the
object and purpose of the ICESCR: to contribute international economic assistance
to the maximum of its available resources ... ").
117. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
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States must reassess the broad leeway it provides states in
implementing their Olmstead plans if it wants to fulfill legal
obligations under the Convention.
IV. Incorporating the Rights Protected Under the
Convention into Olmstead Plans
A. The Negative Aspects of the United States'Approach to
Disability Rights and Community Integration
In comparison to the rest of the world, the United States
exhibits progressive attitudes towards people with disabilities. 11
The U.S. disability rights community paved the way for
legislation 1 9 that ensures individuals with disabilities access to
public education "in the least restrictive environment,"' 20 protects
against discrimination by state and local governments, 12' protects
against discrimination in the employment 22  and public
accommodation sectors, 123 and, eventually, ensures the right to
live in the community if community-based treatment is deemed
appropriate. 124 Unlike their foreign counterparts, 25 people with
disabilities in the United States, like L.C. and E.W. in
Olmstead,126 have access to free legal counsel when "facing
commitment to psychiatric institutions .... [when] being treated
in such institutions, and... [when] seeking release from such
118. See Michael L. Perlin, "Chimes of Freedom:" International Human Rights
and Institutional Mental Disability Law, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 423,
423 (2002) (describing the disability rights "revolution" as "by and large... an
American revolution").
119- See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE
DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 12 (2009) ('The disability rights movement has been
a remarkably successful social movement in the United States. Barely visible in
1970, by 1990 the movement had secured achievement of its greatest legislative
priority-the adoption of the ADA.").
120. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-446, § 612(a)(5), 118 Stat. 2647, 2677 (current version at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(5) (2006)).
121. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336,
§§ 201(1)(a), 202, 104 Stat. 327, 337 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1)(A),
12132 (2006)).
122. § 102(a), 104 Stat. at 331-32 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006
& Supp. 2009)).
123. § 302(a), 104 Stat. at 355 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006)).
124. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 596-97 (1999) (interpreting Title II of the
ADA to prohibit unnecessary institutionalization); see § 202, 104 Stat. at 337
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006)); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2009).
125. Perlin, supra note 22, at 341 (explaining that people with disabilities in
many countries lack access to legal counsel and "regular judicial review" in
commitment proceedings).
126. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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institutions.' 1 27 Arguably, such advancements ensure that people
with disabilities enjoy greater protection under U.S. law than in
any other country in the world.128
Despite this progress, however, some critics argue that the
United States' disability law focuses more on determining whether
individuals meet the statutory requirements to receive the
protections they seek than on the individuals' actual rights or
needs. 129 Plaintiffs bringing suit under Title I of the ADA often
have difficulty prevailing on their claims, 130 because they
frequently fail to meet the strict requirements of being both
"disabled" and "qualified" for employment. 131 Title II plaintiffs
seeking remedies against a state, on the other hand, often
succumb to the state's cost-based defense. 132 Similarly, a litigant
seeking community placement from a state under Medicaid
legislation faces daunting odds:
First, the wide discretion accorded to states in the structuring
of Medicaid benefits makes the program a less than sure
means of promoting the interests of people with disabilities.
Tight state budgets can lead to massive reductions in
Medicaid benefits. Second, the structure of the Medicaid
127. Perlin, supra note 22, at 341
128. See Living History Interview with Iowa Senator Tom Harkin, 15
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 717, 727 (2006) ('The United States leads the
world in efforts to address the needs of people with disabilities, and we can share
our expertise with the international community.").
129. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 119, at 34 (describing criticism of"definition-of-
disability decisions as betraying the promises of the ADA" insofar as they focus
more on determining whether the plaintiff is a qualified individual "rather than on
whether the defendant engaged in improper discrimination"); cf. WAYNE THOMAS
OAKES, PERSPECTIVES ON DISABILITY, DISCRIMINATION, ACCOMMODATIONS, AND
LAW: A COMPARISON OF THE CANADIAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 64 (2005)
(explaining how, in the context of Title I, the current process of determining
disability status makes it "difficult to establish a claim").
130. Plaintiffs bringing claims based on the ADA prevail in approximately one-
third of cases in jury trials, though many cases are cut short at the summary
judgment level and never see a jury. COLKER, supra note 33, at 71. Furthermore,
defendants in ADA cases are far more likely to win on appeal than are plaintiffs.
Id. at 81. Although Professor Colker confines her statistical study to Title I
plaintiffs, she later states, "[t]he Supreme Court has decided three cases that
undercut the ability of private parties to attain effective relief under ADA Title II[,
including Olmstead] .... " Id. at 129.
131. Id. at 70. However, it is important to note that the ADA Amendments Act
of 2008 has broadened the definition of "disability" to include impairments that the
ADA previously did not cover, expanding the number of individuals covered under
the ADA. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat.
3553, 3555-56 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006 & Supp. 2009)).
132. COLKER, supra note 33, at 127 (explaining that the Supreme Court's
handling of the cost defense has created a disturbing trend in ADA Title II
litigation, "mak[ing] it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals to obtain effective
remedies against the state").
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program itself imposes significant obstacles to the ability of
people with disabilities to live and work in the community,
because the program has a strong bias toward paying for the
needs of institutional rather than community placements.
133
In addition to the difficulties litigants face under both Title I and
Title II, there is no heightened scrutiny for discrimination on the
basis of disability, 134 making it more challenging to combat
disability-based discrimination.1 35  Although U.S. disability
legislation is considered to be human rights legislation, 136 the
human rights of people with disabilities seem to have gotten lost
in the shuffle. 137
B. Alternative Approaches
Although considered a world leader in disability rights, 13s the
United States should look to the examples of countries such as
Canada for ideas on how to improve its disability legislation by
focusing on the needs and rights of persons with disabilities.
Canada has rights-based disability legislation "structured upon a
very broad equality clause contained in Canada's constitution, as
well as human rights laws that define disability quite broadly."'
3 9
Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(Charter), Canada's constitution, states that "[e]very individual is
equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and,
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
133. BAGENSTOS, supra note 119, at 139 (footnotes omitted).
134. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985)
("Heightened scrutiny inevitably involves substantive judgments about legislative
decisions, and we doubt that the predicate for such judicial oversight is present
where the classification deals with mental retardation.").
135. Anita Silvers & Leslie Pickering Francis, A New Start on the Road Not
Taken: Driving With Lane to Head offDisability-Based Denials of Rights, 23 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 33, 33-34 (2007) (describing the Supreme Court's Cleburne ruling
that a city zoning ordinance discriminating against persons with mental
retardation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution as a "pyrrhic
victory," as it made it more difficult for litigants challenging classifications on the
basis of disability to prevail).
136. See, e.g., Theresia Degener, International Disability Law-A New Legal
Subject on the Rise: The Interregional Experts'Meeting in Hong Kong, December 13-
17, 1999, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 180, 183 (2000) ('The United States and Canada
were the first countries to adopt anti-discrimination laws and other human rights
legislation for persons with disabilities ....").
137. See OAKES, supra note 129, at 44-46 (explaining how U.S. disability law
focuses on limiting costs, while Canadian disability law focuses less "on costs and
benefits" and more on human rights).
138. See supra notes 118-128 and accompanying text.
139. See OAKES, supra note 129, at 64.
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disability."140 Because the Charter does not define "mental or
physical disability," there was an expectation in early equal rights
debates that courts would construe the phrase broadly, and
Canadian courts eschewed using levels of scrutiny to decide equal
rights claims.14 1 As the Supreme Court of Canada indicates, such
flexibility allows Canadian courts to avoid the strict biomedical
analysis 142 utilized by U.S. courts: "'[H]andicap' must not be
confined within a narrow definition that leaves no room for
flexibility. Instead, courts should adopt a multidimensional
approach that considers the socio-political dimension of 'handicap.'
The emphasis is on human dignity, respect[,] and the right to
equality rather than merely a biomedical condition. 1 43
This "emphasis on human dignity" demonstrates Canada's
commitment to an individualized, rights-based approach to
disability. In addition, unlike the United States, Canada views the
duty to accommodate as a "human rights obligation."1 44 Although
Canadian disability legislation is far from perfect, especially with
regard to institutionalization,1 45 the United States should adopt a
legislative approach that promotes the dignity and individuality of
persons with disabilities, rather than placing so much focus on
strict definitional requirements and cost-effectiveness.
140. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, pt. I, § 15(1), Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
141. OAKES, supra note 129, at 66-70. Though the various Canadian provinces
have different statutes which prohibit discrimination against people with
disabilities, "the definitions of disability used in each instance.., signal a desire to
be broadly inclusive." Id. at 73.
142. See Elizabeth A. Pendo, Disability, Doctors and Dollars: Distinguishing the
Three Faces of Reasonable Accommodation, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1175, 1195
(2002) ("[C]urrent ADA jurisprudence suggests a recommitment to a narrow and
individualistic biomedical model as the primary understanding of disability."
(footnote omitted)).
143. OAKES, supra note 129, at 78 (citing Quebec v. Boisbriand, [2000] 1 S.C.R.
665 (Can.)).
144. Patti Bregman, Disability Law: Canada, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DISABILIrY
(2005), http://www.sage-ereference.com/disability/Articlen231.html (last visited
Feb. 11, 2010). The United States, on the other hand, views a "reasonable
accommodation" analysis from a cost-benefit perspective. See, e.g., Vande Zande v.
Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing the connection
between "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" and advocating that
costs of an accommodation be measured "in relation to the benefits of the
accommodation to the disabled worker as well as to the employer's resources").
145. See DAVID MECHANIC, INESCAPABLE DECISIONS: THE IMPERATIVES OF
HEALTH REFORM 189 (1994) (describing how Canada was slower to
deinstitutionalize people with disabilities than the United States).
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C. Incorporating the Convention: The Solution
In order to implement a more rights-based approach to
deinstitutionalization, the United States should revamp applicable
ADA and Medicaid legislation by incorporating the ideals of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities. By making these changes, the United States will
increase states' compliance with Olmstead's integration mandate,
promote national goals, and fulfill the purpose of the ADA to
"provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities ... ,"146 The applicable provisions of the Convention
provide a framework for reworking the United States' disability
legislation to maximize community integration.
First, the Preamble of the Convention supplies a natural
starting point for reworking U.S. disability legislation. In the
present day, persons with disabilities in the United States have
little control over whether they obtain community placements. 147
By allowing states to keep Medicaid waiver programs small and
their waiting lists short, Medicaid legislation promotes
institutional bias and cost-centered, rather than need-centered,
services. 148 Instead, the United States should advance the
"individual autonomy and independence" of persons with
disabilities, as the Convention requires, 149 by changing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396n(c)(2)(D), which currently states that Medicaid waiver
services will not be provided if the estimated cost of community-
base care exceeds the estimated cost of institutional care. 150 Courts
have acknowledged that this legislation may keep institutionalized
individuals with costly medical impairments who are otherwise
quite capable of exercising "autonomy and independence" in home
and community-based placements.5l Personal autonomy allows
146. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336, § 2, 104
Stat. 327, 328 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006)); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(7) (2006 & Supp. 2009) (setting forth a national goal of "assur[ing]
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency for... individuals [with disabilities]").
147. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
148. Bagenstos, supra note 23, at 61 (describing Medicaid's "strong institutional
bias" against non-institutional care).
149. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
supra note 13, pmbl. I n.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(D) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
151. See, e.g., Radaszewski ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 612,
614 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that, while the plaintiff was "by no means.., an
'unqualified' disabled person in the sense that Olmstead emphasized-he is not
someone who is 'unable to handle or benefit from community settings,'... [t]he
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individuals the freedom to make choices in their everyday lives,
and in general, people who have the opportunity to make
meaningful choices in their lives will suffer from fewer emotional
and psychological problems. 152 Though moving institutionalized
individuals into community settings may increase costs initially,
these costs will likely decrease over time; if individuals with
developmental disabilities are given the opportunity to make
meaningful choices, they may consequently become less likely to
suffer from emotional and psychological problems, in turn
decreasing mental health spending. 153 Although waiver legislation
such as 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) confers upon states the ability to
bypass institutionalization by creating waiver programs that have
more flexible eligibility standards,1 54 they have little incentive to
do so.15  As a result, Congress should modify 42 U.S.C.
State is obliged to maintain a full range of facilities in order to provide care for its
disabled citizens, [which means] it may not always be able to fully realize the cost
savings of placing an individual person in a community setting rather than an
institution." (citations omitted)).
152. Cf. Shannon Kim, Sheryl A. Larson & K. Charlie Lakin, Behavioral
Outcomes of Deinstitutionalization for People with Intellectual Disabilities: A
Review of Studies Conducted Between 1980 and 1999, POL'Y RES. BRIEF (Research
and Training Center on Community Living, Univ. of Minn.), Oct. 1999, at 8,
available at http://ici.umn.edu/products/prb/101/1O1.pdf (noting that thirty-eight
statistical surveys addressing adults moved from institutions to community
placements "demonstrate strongly and consistently that people who move from
institutions to community settings have experiences that help them to improve
their adaptive behavior skills. The studies suggest that community experiences
increasingly provide people with environments and interventions that reduce
challenging behavior. And, a growing body of research suggests that people enjoy a
better quality of life .... ").
153. Compare Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 604 (1999) (plurality opinion)
(disapproving of the district court's cost analysis that compared the cost of
community placement to the cost of institutionalization-and determined that
community placement was less expensive-by noting that "a comparison so simple
overlooks costs the State cannot avoid; most notably, a 'State ... may experience
increased overall expenses by funding community placements without being able to
take advantage of the savings associated with the closure of institutions."' (citation
omitted) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 21, Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536)), with
Sandra L. Harris & Beth A. Glasberg, Functional Behavioral Assessment in
Practice: Concepts and Applications, in HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL AND
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 317, 323 (John W. Jacobson et al. eds., 2007)
(explaining that providing people with developmental disabilities with more choices
in their daily lives has a positive impact on behavior), and Kim, Larson & Lakin,
supra note 152, at 8.
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (2006 & Supp. 2009); Deficit Reduction Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6071(a), 120 Stat. 4, 102 (2006) (authorizing the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to fund Demonstration Waiver Project
homes).
155. See, e.g., DiPolito, supra note 75, at 1403 (using the state of Georgia as an
example to show the financial incentives of keeping individuals with disabilities
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§ 1396n(c)(2)(D) to provide that individual needs, not costs,
determine the most appropriate placement for individuals with
disabilities. If treatment professionals, family members, and the
individual in question agree that community placement is best,
legislation should allow for the individual to receive community-
based treatment, regardless of the cost, without requiring that the
state resort to a waiver to effectuate the placement.
Second, Article 14 of the Convention, titled "Liberty and
security of the person,"'156 could be utilized to strengthen the
integration mandate set out in Olmstead and U.S. disability
legislation. Abiding by this provision, which prohibits the unlawful
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty of persons with disabilities, 157
requires reconsidering the legislation creating caps on the number
of community placements available under Medicaid waivers 5 8 and
Justice Ginsburg's "reasonably paced waiting list" analysis in
Olmstead.159 The Medicaid waiver legislation imposing limits on
the size of waiver programs 60 and providing that slots under
waiver programs will not open up unless "individuals... die or
become ineligible for services"'161 constructively deprives persons
with disabilities of their liberty by restricting their ability to
obtain spots on waiting lists, and, subsequently, community
placement. 62  Because it perpetuates institutionalization,
legislation for persons with disabilities should require states to
request more waiver slots to meet the demand of qualified
individuals with disabilities who are seeking community
placement, thereby reducing the size of waiting lists. This
requirement would impact the "reasonably paced waiting list"
analysis from Olmstead, creating a fair and uniform standard in
place of the ambiguous one by which state waiver programs are
currently judged. 63 Under the proposed standard, a "reasonably
paced waiting list" would truly move at a reasonable pace, with
institutionalized).
156. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
supra note 13, art. 14.
157. Id. art. 14(1)(b).
158. 42 C.F.R. § 441.303(f)(6) (2009) (imposing "a limit on the size of the waiver
program unless the State requests and the Secretary approves a greater number of
waiver participants in a waiver amendment").
159. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 606 (1999) (plurality opinion).
160. 42 C.F.R. § 441.303(f)(6) (2009).
161. 42. U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(9) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
162. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text; Part II.A.
163. See Kubo, supra note 59, at 743 (discussing the "wide deference" given to




the size of waiver programs and waiting lists fluctuating relative
to the demand of qualified individuals seeking community
placement. Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief in the form of
community-based treatment would enjoy greater success ,164
thereby supporting the autonomy and independence of people with
disabilities, and preventing the deprivation of their liberty.
Article 19 of the Convention, requiring States Parties to
ensure that "[p]ersons with disabilities have access to a range of
in-home, residential[,] and other community-support services...
to prevent isolation or segregation from the community,"165 should
be incorporated into the integration regulation.1 66 In order to
"administer services, programs, and activities in the most
integrated setting appropriate" for persons with disabilities, 167 the
United States must expand its range of services to accommodate
the residential needs of this varied population. This includes
offering home and community-based services to those individuals
who would not qualify for Medicaid waiver services because of the
cost-of-care maximums imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(D), 168
and expanding the size of the waiver programs in general.
Congress can amend 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d)169 to state that
determining "the most integrated setting appropriate" for
individuals with disabilities must be done on a case-by-case basis,
and to require proper measures to ensure that each individual can
be placed in such a setting. Additionally, because the Convention
recognizes the basic right to choose one's place of residence
without being "obliged to live in a particular living arrangement"
as a human right, 170 the United States should revise its legislation
to correspond with and protect this right, 171 unless doing so
"impos[es] a disproportionate or undue burden."'172
164. Cf. COLKER, supra note 33, at 129 (noting the difficulty in winning an ADA
claim after Olmstead and other related cases).
165. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
supra note 13, art. 19(b).
166. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2009).
167. Id.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(D) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
169. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d).
170. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
supra note 13, art. 19(a).
171. See Daniel Barstow Magraw & Lauren Baker, Globalization, Communities
and Human Rights: Community-Based Property Rights and Prior Informed
Consent, 35 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POLY 413, 415 (2007) ("Eventually, thea human
rights [enshrined in binding international agreements, including the Convention,]
became recognized as customary international law, some even reaching the status
of jus cogens." (footnotes omitted)).
172. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
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Finally, Article 2 of the Convention, which defines
"reasonable accommodation,"'173 and Article 4, which requires that
States Parties take measures to achieve the rights recognized by
the Convention "to the maximum of [their] available resources,"'174
provide a rights-based alternative to states' fundamental
alteration defense. Although the United States would likely resist
this modification, 75 it is necessary to secure the rights
championed by the Convention. Under Article 2 of the Convention,
a State Party is obligated to provide "reasonable accommodation"
unless doing so would "impos[e] a disproportionate or undue
burden."' 76 As with reasonable accommodation analysis under the
ADA, the Convention's concept of reasonable accommodation is
intertwined with the concept of undue burden,177 and a State
Party's duty is not boundless. Incorporating the Convention's
"reasonable accommodation" standard into U.S. disability
legislation, therefore, appears to make for a seamless process.
The Convention, however, carefully points out that what is
"reasonable" for one country may not be for another. 78 Article 4
supra note 13, art. 2.
173. Id.
174. Id. art. 4, cl. 2.
175. As an example of U.S. attitudes towards financial considerations in
addressing individuals with disabilities' needs, compare the United Nations'
"maximum available resources" language with Olmstead, which holds that states
that provide community-based treatment to individuals with disabilities have a
cost-based defense to making "reasonable modifications" to avoid discrimination.
Id.; Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 603 (1999) (plurality opinion). According to the
Court, this cost-based defense should be based on a state's entire mental health
budget, rather than all of the United States' "available resources" as the
Convention would require. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603 (plurality opinion); United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 13, art.
4, cl. 2.
176. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
supra note 13, art. 2.
177. The ADA equivalent is "undue hardship," which applies to both Titles I and
II. Compare Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,
§ 101(10)(A)-(B), 104 Stat. 327, 331 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10)(A)-
(B) (2006)) (defining "undue hardship"), and Nina Golden, Access This: Why
Institutions of Higher Education Must Provide Access to the Internet to Students
with Disabilities, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 363, 382 (2008) ("While the
reasonable modification requirement in Title II does not explicitly include an undue
hardship or burden defense, courts have incorporated that defense into the
fundamental alteration defense."), with United Nations Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 13, art. 2 ("Reasonable accommodation'
means necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a
disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to
persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of
all human rights and fundamental freedoms .... ").
178. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
supra note 13, art. 4.
Olmstead Plans Revisited
requires that each nation "take measures to the maximum of its
available resources" to protect the rights recognized by the
Convention, 179 which conflicts with historic United States policy
towards "entitlement spending."180 Given the United States' status
as one of the world's wealthiest countries,181 utilizing the
"maximum of its available resources" could involve allocating
significantly more resources than the nation currently does to
achieve the level of deinstitutionalization the Convention
advocates. 8 2 Prior to the Convention's drafting, the United
Nations indicated that States Parties should supply "special
measures designed to meet the particular requirements of persons
who, for reasons such as sex, age, disablement, family
responsibilities[,] or social or cultural status, are generally
recognised to require special protection or assistance," even if
doing so is expensive. 8 3 In 2006, the United Nations "affirmed its
position" that people with disabilities should be afforded these
"special measures" regardless of the additional costs involved:
The obligation of States Parties to the Covenant to promote
progressive realization of the relevant rights to the maximum
of their available resources clearly requires Governments to do
much more than merely abstain from taking measures which
might have a negative impact on persons with disabilities. The
obligation in the case of such a vulnerable and disadvantaged
group is to take positive action to reduce structural
disadvantages and to give appropriate preferential treatment
to people with disabilities in order to achieve the objectives of
179. Id. art. 4, cl. 2.
180. The United States seeks to cut costs by reducing its services to vulnerable
populations, rather than using the "maximum of its available resources" as Article
4 of the Convention requires. Id.; see Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006); see also President George W. Bush, President Signs S.1932,
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (Feb. 8, 2006) (transcript available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases2006/02/20060208-
8.html) ('The bill I sign today restrains spending for entitlement programs ... .
181. See, e.g., James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime
Helped Make the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331,
343, fig.2 (2009) (illustrating the Gross Domestic Product of many wealthy nations,
with the United States among those countries near the top).
182. See United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
supra note 13, art. 4 (describing the lengths to which States Parties should
incorporate the Convention's protections into their legislation).
183. Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation, art. 5, cl. 2, opened for signature June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31, 36
(entered into force June 15, 1960); see Arlene S. Kanter, The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities and Its Implications for the
Rights of Elderly People Under International Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 527, 535-
37 (2009) (discussing United Nations documents that address the resources and




full participation and equality within society for all persons
with disabilities. This almost invariably means that additional
resources will need to be made available for this purpose and
that a wide range of specially tailored measures will be
required.,8 4
According to this analysis, the United States should rework its
legislation to model the Convention by changing Medicaid waivers
and ADA legislation which presently incentivize states operating
their Olmstead plans in the cheapest manner possible. 8 5 This
legislation must be changed to force the allocation of additional
state and federal resources to deinstitutionalizing individuals,
despite the recent push to reduce "entitlement spending."18 6 As a
result, the fundamental alteration defense must be completely
revamped. Congress must amend 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7), setting
forth a much stricter standard than the current requirement that
public entities make reasonable modifications unless they can
demonstrate that doing so would fundamentally alter the nature of
their programs. 8 7  Accordingly, the "sensibly construed"
fundamental alteration defense established in Olmstead'88 must
also be reconsidered. Although states should still have to consider
delivering services to people with disabilities in an equitable
manner, 8 9 they should have a much higher burden in showing
that modifications would significantly alter the nature of their
programs, allowing people with disabilities a more meaningful
opportunity to assert their rights under the Convention.
Conclusion
Considering the fact that it is one of the world's wealthiest
countries and the forerunner in disability rights, the United States
184. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 5, Persons with Disabilities, 9, U.N. Doc. No.
E/1995/22 (Sept. 12, 1994) (emphasis added).
185. See Bagenstos, supra note 23 at 80 n.350 ("This country certainly has a
history of attempting to implement deinstitutionalization 'on the cheap,'.., with
devastating results for deinstitutionalized populations.") (quoting Olmstead v. L.C.,
527 U.S. 581, 610 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
186. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006)
(demonstrating the United States' goal to reduce spending on vulnerable
populations); President George W. Bush, President Signs S.1932, Deficit Reduction
Act of 2005 (Feb. 8, 2006) (transcript available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060208-8.html).
187. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2009).
188. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion).
189. See id. at 605 ('Each disabled person is entitled to treatment in the most
integrated setting possible for that person .... ') (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307, 327 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
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should set an example for the rest of the world by not only
ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, but also by changing its disability legislation to
provide people with disabilities the superior community-based care
for which the Convention calls. Although doing so may seem costly
at the outset, the process of incorporating the Convention rights
into U.S. disability legislation would result in several long-term
benefits for the country. First, by increasing community
integration, overall long-term care spending would likely decrease,
as community-based care is drastically less expensive than
institutional care. 190 Second, the quality of life for individuals with
disabilities who would then have access to community placements
would markedly improve. 191 With this increased quality of life,
total health care expenditures for the population of people with
disabilities would likely decrease. 92 Finally, creating a more
rights-based system would further the purpose of the ADA,
reinvigorating the nation's commitment to promoting the equality
of people with disabilities and eliminating discrimination.1 93 As
Professor Ann Hubbard states,
If the ADA stands for anything, it is the proposition that all
Americans-with or without disabilities-want the same
things for themselves and their families and have the same
desires, needs, aspirations[,] and ambitions. They therefore
must all have the same opportunities to develop their skills
and talents and to envision and obtain their personal
conception of the good life, or, if you like, the American
dream. 194
By incorporating the rights established under the Convention, the
United States would enable people with disabilities to pursue this
dream.
190. See Scotellaro, supra note 10, at 777.
191. Cf. John F. Muller, Olmstead v. L.C. and the Voluntary Cessation Doctrine:
Toward a More Holistic Analysis of the "Effectively Working Plan," 118 Yale L.J.
1013, 1013 (2009) ("In Olmstead, the Court reasoned that institutional placement
of individuals capable of living in the community 'perpetuates unwarranted
assumptions' about such individuals and 'severely diminishes' their quality of life."
(quoting Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600-01 (plurality opinion))).
192. Increased quality of life has a positive impact on both mental and physical
health. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2001: MENTAL
HEALTH: NEW UNDERSTANDING, NEW HOPE xvi (2001) ("[S]cientific evidence from
the field of behavioural medicine has demonstrated a fundamental connection
between mental and physical health .... ").
193. See Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,
§§ 2(a)(8), (b)(1), 104 Stat. 327, 329 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(7),
(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2009)).
194. Ann Hubbard, Meaningful Lives and Major Life Activities, 55 ALA. L. REV.
997, 998 (2004) (footnote omitted).
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